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Article 2

At the End of Our Article III Rope
WHY WE STILL NEED THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT
Sarah M. Stephens†
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.”1

INTRODUCTION
Historically, women’s organizations were “hopelessly
divided upon the Equal Rights Amendment.”2 The National
Woman’s Party (NWP)3 began pursuing a constitutionally based
equal rights solution, known as the constitutional strategy,
around 1919.4 Meanwhile, groups such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and eventually the National
Organization of Women (NOW) tried to achieve women’s equality
by seeking favorable interpretation of existing Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis, referred to as
† J.D. 2008, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 2004, Emory University.
The author thanks Michael Brodlieb, Shannon Daugherty, Lena Smith, and the Brooklyn
Law Review staff for their insightful comments and superb editorial assistance.
1 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972). The most recent text of the Equal Rights
Amendment, as proposed in the 113th Congress, provides:

Section 1: Women shall have equal rights in the United States and every place
subject to its jurisdiction. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2: Congress and the several States shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3: This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
S.J. Res. 10, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 56, 113th Cong. (2013).
2 Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical
Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 781 (2004).
3 The National Woman’s Party, sometimes known as the Alice Paul Party, was
formed by Alice Paul and Lucy Burns in 1916 to organize for constitutional-based rights,
including women’s suffrage and the Equal Rights Amendment. In 1997, the NWP became
a non-profit, nonpolitical, educational organization. See Women of Protest: Photographs from
the Records of the National Woman’s Party, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/
collections/static/women-of-protest/images/history.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
4 For a historical account of the competing interests behind this dual
strategy, see Mayeri, supra note 2, at 756-801.

397

398

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:2

the litigation strategy. By the end of the 1960s, these divergent
feminist factions coalesced around a dual strategy to pursue equal
rights for women under the law.5 The ACLU, NOW, and others
lent their support to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to
encourage its passage in Congress and to achieve ratification by
the states, while continuing to campaign for equal protection by
challenging existing law in federal court.6
At times, the decision to pursue change on dual fronts
hindered both the constitutional strategy and the litigation
strategy. The constitutional strategy, exemplified by the
pendency of the ERA, hindered the litigation strategy by making
the Supreme Court more hesitant to rule that sex is a suspect
class subject to heightened scrutiny review.7 Meanwhile, the
litigation strategy impeded the constitutional strategy by
lending support to those who argued that women’s rights could
be achieved without the ERA.8 The extensive number of
discouraging losses suffered by equal rights advocates before a
Supreme Court that upheld sex-based differentiation in
government benefits,9 disparate treatment of pregnant
women,10 discrimination on the basis of sex in the provision of
medical care,11 and unequal treatment in the military,12 made
See generally Mayeri, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 433 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). During this period, equal rights advocates also
campaigned for the inclusion of sex as a protected category for purposes of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as well as the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
7 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has
assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning
with the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems
to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which
is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly
prescribed legislative processes.”). The Court ultimately held that sex-based distinctions
are only subject to intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
8 Mayeri, supra note 2, at 767.
9 See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a Social Security
rule that allowed women to exclude more low-wage-earning years from their average
monthly wage calculation than men); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding a
tax exemption for widows but not widowers). While applying unequal treatment to men
and women, these decisions, as well as Schlesinger v. Ballard cited infra can be seen as
allowing affirmative action on behalf of women to compensate for past discrimination.
10 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding that pregnancy
discrimination is not discrimination “on the basis of sex” and therefore not violative of
the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee).
11 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Hyde Amendment which prohibited federal funding for abortions except where the
procedure is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program to pay the expenses
incident to non-therapeutic abortions for indigent women where the state pays
5

6
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clear the continued utility of a constitutional amendment that
could prohibit sex discrimination and preserve bodily integrity.
Unfortunately, the ERA failed to gain the necessary votes
for ratification and feminists were left with only the litigation
strategy. Yet, despite significant losses in the courts, feminists
remained optimistic they could overcome legally entrenched sex
discrimination without the ERA. They were buoyed by piecemeal
judicial pronouncements that ultimately recognized a
heightened scrutiny standard when reviewing sex-based laws.13
In fact, litigants continued the struggle for equal rights
throughout the conservative Reagan years14 and into the 1990s,
when some legal scholars began to claim victory, arguing a de
facto ERA could be found in the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence.15 Shortly after the Court decided United States v.
Virginia16 in 1996, requiring a “genuine” and “exceedingly
persuasive” justification for sex-based discrimination, Justice

expenses incident to childbirth); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that Title
XIX of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of non-therapeutic abortions
as a condition of participation in the joint federal-state Medicaid program established
by that statute); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (holding that the a St. Louis city
policy that prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city’s two publicly run hospitals
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the
city did provide facilities for childbirth in those same hospitals).
12 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding the male-only draft by
reasoning that women’s exclusion from combat justified sex-based differentiation in other
areas, including the draft); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding the military
could enforce a sex-specific “up or out” policy that gave male officers less time than female
officers to win a promotion before forcing their resignations). It is worth noting that
members of the movement against the ERA cited women in combat as being one outcome of
its passage. On January 23, 2013, the United States military officially lifted its ban on
female soldiers serving in combat roles. Ernesto Londoño, Pentagon Removes Ban on
Women in Combat, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/pentagon-to-remove-ban-on-women-in-combat/2013/01/23/6cba86f6659e-11e2-85f5-a8a9228e55e7_story.html.
13 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
14 For a discussion of the conservative backlash against women’s rights that
took place in the eighties, see SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991).
15 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1332-34
(2006) (“Cass Sunstein observes, ‘The American constitution now has something very
much like a constitutional ban on sex discrimination—not because of the original
understanding of its text but because of new judicial interpretations.’”).
16 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (although expressly
adhering to the intermediate standard, the Court emphasized that for sex-based
classifications to pass muster under the intermediate standard, the state must
demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive” justification, and “[t]he justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation,” thus practically
elevating the standard to something closer to strict scrutiny); but cf., Nguyen v. INS., 533
U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (undermining the analysis of United States v.
Virginia and applying something less than intermediate scrutiny).

400

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:2

Ginsburg herself observed: “There is no practical difference
between what has evolved and the [ERA].”17
The opinions authored by the Supreme Court in the last
several years indicate this victory was prematurely declared.
The application of the Equal Protection Clause to sex
discrimination claims is limited by various factors, including the
Court’s failure to subject claims of sex discrimination to the
“strict scrutiny” standard of review; the Court’s formalistic
requirement that men and women must be “similarly situated”
for any heightened scrutiny standard to apply, and the Court’s
unwillingness to recognize discrimination claims based upon a
theory of disparate impact.18 Moreover, in the 20 years since
Virginia, as Court politics have polarized, the Court has
interpreted the intermediate scrutiny standard with increasing
leniency and women have lost many of the protections hard-won
in the 1970s. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,19 allowing employers to interfere
with women’s healthcare choices, women’s rights advocates
surely must feel disappointed in the litigation strategy’s failures
and compelled to reinvigorate the fight for the ERA.
This article argues that it is time to return to the clean
sweep approach of the constitutional strategy and pursue
ratification of the ERA. The ERA remains the best option to
overcome the inability of existing equal protection jurisprudence
17 Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Oct. 5, 1997, at 65.
18 Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating
Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 1201, 1205 (2005).
19 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014). In a
television interview regarding her dissent in the Hobby Lobby case, Justice Ginsburg
stated, “Contraceptive protection is something every woman must have access to, to
control her own destiny . . . [Hobby Lobby] has no constitutional right to foist that belief
on the hundreds and hundreds of women who work for them who don’t share that belief.”
Katie Couric, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Hobby Lobby Dissent, YAHOO! NEWS,
http://news.yahoo.com/katie-couric-interviews-ruth-bader-ginsburg-185027624.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015). “The Court’s decision, at heart, is rooted in a very old and very
outdated misunderstanding about women. And that is the idea that women’s
reproductive health is somehow ‘extra,’ ‘different,’ or ‘separate.’ This fundamentally
wrong assumption about women’s reproductive health has been used for ages to take
away women’s rights. By reinforcing this dangerous approach to women’s reproductive
health, the Court has put all aspects of women’s rights at risk.” Sharon Levin, The Hobby
Lobby Decision Takes a Fundamentally Flawed Approach to Reproductive Health, NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CENTER BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014), available at http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/hobbylobby-decision-takes-fundamentally-flawed-approach-reproductive-health. “This ruling goes
out of its way to declare that discrimination against women isn’t discrimination.” Ilyse Hogue,
Statement: NARAL Pro-Choice America Reaction to the Supreme Court Decision on Hobby
Lobby, June 30, 2014, available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/pressreleases/2014/pr06302014_scotus_hobbylobby.html.
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to achieve rigorous protection against sex discrimination. Part I
provides a background of the ERA and the surrounding
movement. Part II problematizes Article III jurisprudence,
focusing on the limits of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the
Equal Protection Clause in sex discrimination cases. Part III
highlights court opinions that have interpreted state
constitution ERAs to provide extensive protection against sex
discrimination in the reproductive rights context, and then
reimagines the Hobby Lobby decision as it would result under a
federal ERA, in light of those analyses.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE ERA

A.

The Nineteenth Amendment: “[T]he right by which all
others could be secured”20

The history of the ERA dates back to 1848 and the first
Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York.21
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, who met as
abolitionists working against slavery, convened a two-day
meeting of 300 women and men to call for justice for women in
a society that systematically barred them from the rights and
privileges of citizenship.22 A Declaration of Sentiments23 and 11
other resolutions were adopted with ease, but the proposal for
women’s suffrage passed only after impassioned speeches by
Stanton and former slave Frederick Douglass, who declared
20 See Rutgers, The State Uni. of N.J., Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions,
THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY PAPERS PROJECT, at n.7,
http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/seneca.html (last updated Aug. 2010) [hereinafter Declaration
of Sentiments and Resolutions] (internal quotation marks omitted) (referencing Elizabeth
Cady Stanton and Frederick Douglass’s description of women’s suffrage).
21 The history of the struggle for women’s rights in the United States dates back
to its very formation, through the Reconstruction Era, and up to present day. See Abigail
Adams’ plea for her husband, John, Massachusetts representative to the Continental
Congress in Philadelphia, to “remember the ladies” when drafting the “new [C]ode of laws.”
Abigail Adams’ “Remember the Ladies” Letter, PBS (Aug. 26, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/adams/filmmore/ps_ladies.html. That request, sadly, went
unheeded. See Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), available at
http://www.historytools.org/sources/Abigail-John-Letters.pdf (“As to your extraordinary code
of laws, I cannot but laugh . . . we know better than to repeal our masculine systems.”); see
also Rebecca Hall & Angela P. Harris, Hidden Histories, Racialized Gender, and the Legacy
of Reconstruction: The Story of United States v. Cruikshank, in WOMEN AND THE LAW
STORIES (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011) (explaining the brave
actions of minority women in response to acts of violence and male dominance against them
following the Civil War, their hopes in the new Reconstruction Civil Rights Regime, and the
failure of the Supreme Court to grant them privileges and immunities of citizenship in light
of its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases).
22 See Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, supra note 20.
23 Id.
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suffrage as the “right by which all others could be secured.”24
Unfortunately, few outside of the women’s movement took this
call for women’s suffrage seriously.
After the Civil War, Elizabeth Stanton, Susan B.
Anthony, and Sojourner Truth fought in vain to have women
included in new constitutional amendments that gave rights to
former slaves.25 The Fourteenth Amendment defined citizens
as, “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,” and
guaranteed equal protection of the laws, but rather than
expand the rights of all disenfranchised people, in referring to
the electorate, the amendment introduced the word “male” into
the Constitution for the first time.26 Women were likewise
omitted from the Fifteenth Amendment, which declared that
“[t]he right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be denied or
abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”27 Women of all races continued to be denied the
ballot. In 1875, the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett
confirmed that while women qualified as citizens, not all
citizens held the right to vote, and states were not required to
allow women to vote.28
Excluded from both Reconstruction-era Amendments,
Stanton and Anthony immediately began campaigning for a
new constitutional amendment to ensure women the right to
vote.29 As the first wave of suffragists died out, leaders such as
Carrie Chapman Catt of the National American Woman
Suffrage Association and Alice Paul, founder of the NWP took

24
25
26

Id.
Id.
U.S CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1-2. The Fourteenth Amendment provides,

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state.
Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
29 See Roberta W. Francis, The History Behind the Equal Rights Amendment,
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: UNFINISHED BUSINESS FOR THE CONSTITUTION,
http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/history.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
27

28
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up the cause.30 Seventy-one years after the Seneca Falls
Convention, the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the
right to vote when it finally passed through Congress.31
After the Nineteenth Amendment passed Congress in
1919, it quickly gained “more than half the ratifications it needed
in the first year. Then it ran into stiff opposition from states’
rights advocates, the liquor lobby, business interests against
higher wages for women, and a number of women themselves,
who believed claims that the amendment would threaten the
family”32 by dividing husband and wife and disrupting the social
order. “Finally, the battle narrowed down to a six-week seesaw
struggle in Tennessee.”33 Illustrating the precarious nature of
the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, its fate “was decided
by a single vote, that of 24-year-old legislator Harry Burn, who
switched from ‘no’ to ‘yes’ in response to a letter from his
mother saying, ‘Hurrah, and vote for suffrage!’”34
Suffragists thus won the first, and still the only, specific
written guarantee of women’s equal rights in the Constitution,
the Nineteenth Amendment, which declared, “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”35
B.

Beyond Suffrage: The Equal Rights Amendment

Despite the significant change wrought by the Nineteenth
Amendment, many laws and practices in the workplace and in
society still perpetuated men’s status as privileged and women’s
status as second-class citizens.36 Unsatisfied, some in the suffrage
movement began to call for a prohibition on all laws based upon sex
distinctions.37 In 1923, for the celebration of the 75th anniversary of
the 1848 Women’s Rights Convention, Alice Paul introduced the
ERA (then known as the Lucretia Mott Amendment), proclaiming,

Id.
For more on the history of woman suffrage, see 5 NAT’L AM. WOMAN
SUFFRAGE ASS’N. THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE: 1900-1920 (Ida Husted Harper
ed. 1922), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/29878/29878-h/29878-h.htm.
32 Francis, supra note 29.
33 Id.
34 Id. (citing Carol Lynn Yellin, Countdown in Tennessee, 1920, 30 AM.
HERITAGE 12 (1978)).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
36 Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1013-14 (2002).
37 Id.
30
31
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“[w]e shall not be safe until the principle of equal rights is written
into the framework of our government.”38
The ERA was first proposed in Congress on December
13, 1923 as H.R.J. Res. 7539 and was re-introduced into every
session of Congress between 1923 and 1972.40 During that
period, American feminists split into the two opposing camps
that would ultimately pursue the divergent constitutional and
litigation strategies. Some feminists, like the members of the
NWP and certain professional women’s groups, believed that
adoption of the ERA represented a critical step in the fight to
eliminate sex-based legal distinctions, and offered strong
support in favor of the constitutional amendment.41 These same
advocates were opposed to protectionist legislation and believed
that special laws for women did not protect women so much as
hinder their advancement.42 The other camp, which included
unions and the ACLU, had fought hard for minimum wage,
maximum hours, and additional sex-based protections that
they feared the ERA would eliminate.43 This camp preferred a
piecemeal strategy, promoting discriminatory laws that
arguably benefitted women, while attacking discriminatory
laws that did not.44
See Francis, supra note 29.
Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 75, 68th Cong. (1923). The original
text of the ERA, which differed only slightly from the current version, provided:
38

39

Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
40 Martha Griffiths and the Equal Rights Amendment, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/griffiths/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); see
infra note 49, at pp. 2-8.

In most years, [the ERA] never reached the full Senate. But in 1946, after
debate on the Senate floor, the ERA commanded a majority of votes, though
less than the requisite two-thirds for a constitutional amendment. In 1950
and 1953, the Senate passed the ERA with a rider that nullified its equal
protection aspects.
Martha Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 419, 429-30 (2008).
41 Mayeri, supra note 2, at 762.
42 Id. Protectionist legislation included laws limiting the number of hours
women could work. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Such laws discouraged
employers from hiring women, as the Supreme Court had previously held that men
could not be subject to such laws. Further, protectionist legislation served to reinforce
stereotypes of women as fragile or feeble.
43 Mayeri, supra note 2, at 762.
44 Id. at 764.
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In 1969, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) began to argue that Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination outlawed most sex-based workplace
protections.45 This meant that the protectionist laws which
benefitted women in their employment were now illegal, while
many of the discriminatory laws which harmed women in other
areas of their lives remained in place. Their arguments over
the value of protectionist legislation rendered moot, the two
groups could finally reunite. Indeed, frustrated by a lack of
progress in the courts, those in favor of the litigation strategy
joined with other feminist organizations to begin a hard push
for the ERA, while cautiously continuing to pursue litigation
which would ultimately lead to successes such as Reed v. Reed46
and Frontiero v. Richardson.47
In 1972, the ERA finally passed Congress and it was
sent to the states, with a seven year deadline for ratification.48
Like the Nineteenth Amendment, a great deal of momentum
surrounded the ratification of the ERA. In the first year, the
ERA received 22 of the necessary 38 state ratifications.49 But
the pace slowed as the same opposition groups that resisted the
Nineteenth Amendment began to organize against the ERA.50
45 Mayeri supra note 2, at 797-99. Other women’s rights organizations, which had
previously opposed the ERA, began to offer their support in favor of the constitutional
amendment during the late sixties because of the EEOC’s refusal to enforce the prohibition
against sex discrimination provided for in Title VII. Id. at 775 n.90. This refusal to enforce a
statutorily provided equal protection in employment guarantee united feminists in the need
for political mobilization. Id.
46 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a court cannot discriminate
in the naming of an executor of an estate on the basis of sex).
47 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that the U.S.
military could not discriminate in the administration of benefits for dependent spouses
on the basis of the sex).
48 THOMAS NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42979, THE PROPOSED EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 8 (2013), available at
http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/misc/CRS_2013_summary.pdf.
49 Id. at 9.
50 Phyllis Schlafly, a conservative activist, led the movement against the ERA
after it was passed in the U.S. House and Senate in 1972. Her campaign, “Stop ERA,”
galvanized opposition against the attempt to secure equal rights for women in the U.S.
Constitution. Schlafly and members of the Eagle Forum group traveled around the
United States arguing that protective laws against sexual assault and for alimony would
be swept away; the tendency for the mother to receive child custody in a divorce case
would be eliminated; same-sex marriages would be permitted; the all-male military draft
would become immediately unconstitutional; and that even single-sex restrooms would be
banned if the ERA became law. Siegel, supra note 15, at 1401; Davis, supra note 40 at
426-27; see also DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY & GRASSROOTS
CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S CRUSADE, ch.9 (2005). The “ERA failed, but the consequences
happened anyway. Unisex bathrooms are in college dorms around the country. Women
are joining the armed forces—by choice. And modern alimony laws look at sex-neutral
factors, such as need and contribution, when determining who should receive support.”
Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution: Where We Are at the End of the
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Only eight states ratified the ERA in 1973, three in 1974, one
in 1975, and none in 1976.51 In all, 35 states ratified the ERA,52
but the seven-year time limit for ratification passed without
the three additional states needed to make the amendment
law.53 Congress extended the ratification period an additional
five years.54 However, the political tide continued to turn more
conservative, and on the congressionally imposed deadline of
June 30, 1982, no additional states had voted for ratification.55
One hundred thirty-four years after the Seneca Falls
Convention and sixty-two years after ratification of the

Century, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2000). Even same-sex marriage is now permitted in
about half of the states, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has been
ruled unconstitutional in many arenas, including in the administration of various
federal programs and benefits. See The Changing Landscape of Same-Sex Marriage,
WASH. POST, (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/
same-sex-marriage/; see also e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(holding that, because the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as a union
between one man and one woman, is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, the IRS cannot discriminate against same sex surviving spouses
for the purposes of federal estate tax exemptions). Schlafly and others also argued that
the ERA would lead to “abortion on demand.” In order to increase their political capital,
proponents of the ERA have argued that the ERA would have a limited impact on
reproductive autonomy. Mayeri, supra note 2, at 1274-80. The author firmly disagrees.
See infra Part III.
51 NEALE, supra note 48, at 9.
52 Id. at 9 n.45. States that have not ratified the ERA include: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. Battle Lines Being
Drawn in Illinois on Equal Rights Amendment, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://politics.suntimes.com/article/washington/battle-lines-being-drawn-illinois-equalrights-amendment/sun-08102014-329pm.
53 NEALE, supra note 48, at 9 n.45.
54 Whether Congress had the authority to extend the time for ratification set
forth in the ERA’s proposing clause without re-submitting the ERA to the states is a
matter in dispute. After the 27th Amendment, also known as the “Madison Amendment,”
was ratified by Michigan in 1992 and became part of the Constitution 203 years after it
was submitted to the states, some legal scholars argued that the ERA could still become
law. See Allison Held et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains
Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113 (1997)
(arguing that the seven year time limit in the ERA’s proposing clause was irrelevant
because states ratify only the text of the amendment and not the proposing clause and
that Congress has the power to determine the timeliness of the ERA after final state
ratification and can extend, revise, or ignore a time limit); but cf., Orrin G. Hatch, The
Equal Rights Amendment Extension: A Critical Analysis, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19
(1979) (arguing the extension of time for ratification violated the Article V process). The
Congressional Research Service analyzed this legal argument in 1996 and concluded that
acceptance of the Madison Amendment does have implications for the premise that
approval of the ERA by three more states could allow Congress to declare ratification
accomplished. As of 2007, ratification bills testing this three-state strategy have been
introduced in one or more legislative sessions in eight states (Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Virginia), and supporters are seeking to
move such bills in all 15 of the unratified states. NEALE, supra note 48, at 12.
55 NEALE, supra note 48, at 10.
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Nineteenth Amendment, the country remained unwilling to
guarantee women constitutional rights equal to those of men.
Women’s rights advocates were undeterred.56 Congress
reintroduced the ERA on July 14, 1982 and it has been before
every session of Congress since that time.57 Two different types of
ERA legislation came before Congress in the 2014 session:
traditional legislation to ratify the ERA by the Constitution’s
Article V ratification process58 and legislation designed to remove
the time limit on the ERA’s ratification process and declare it
complete when three additional states ratify the amendment.59
Ratification remains an active issue in state legislatures
as well. In February 2014, the Virginia House voted to ratify
the ERA, but a Republican House subcommittee killed the
proposal later that month.60 In May 2014, the Illinois Senate
voted to ratify the ERA.61 A vote in the Illinois House could
occur before the end of the 2014-2015 legislative term.62 Also,
the Senate Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections
in the Nevada Legislature has requested the drafting of a
Senate Joint Resolution to ratify the ERA in 2015.63
II.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO DISCRIMINATION HAVE NOT
ACHIEVED EQUALITY OF RIGHTS

While Congress and state legislatures debated the ERA
during the 1970s, a new field of equal rights jurisprudence
started to develop in the courts. Drawing from the race
discrimination cases of the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court
began to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to provide a
Francis, supra note 29.
For more on the re-introduction of the ERA in 1982, see Serena Mayeri, A
New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism,
103 NW. U.L. REV. 1223 (2009).
58 H.R.J. Res. 56, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 10, 113th Cong. (2013).
59 H.R.J. Res. 113, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 15, 113th Cong. (2013); see
also Held et al., supra note 54, at 113 (arguing that the ERA will become a part of the
U.S. Constitution upon its ratification by three additional states).
60 Bill Sizemore, Equal Rights Amendment Rejected Again in Virginia House,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Feb.
27,
2014),
http://hamptonroads.com/2014/02/equal-rightsamendment-rejected-again-va-house.
61 See Feminist Newswire, Illinois Senate Passes Resolution to Ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment, FEMINIST FOUND. MAJORITY BLOG (May 23, 2014, 12:52 PM),
http://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2014/05/23/illinois-senate-passes-resolution-to-ratifyera/; Senate Votes to Ratify Equal Rights Amendment, ILLINOIS SENATE DEMOCRATS
(May 23, 2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.illinoissenatedemocrats.com/index.php/caucusnews/blog-archive/4190-illinois-senate-votes-to-ratify-equal-rights-amendment.
62 Sean Whaley, ERA Isn’t Nostalgia in Nevada, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (July 28, 2014,
12:53 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/politics/government/era-isn-t-nostalgia-nevada.
63 Id.
56

57
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prohibition against sex discrimination in certain circumstances
where none had previously existed. Although this has led to
some fundamental protections for women and perhaps has
achieved most of the early goals of ERA proponents, Article III
courts have stopped short of providing women comprehensive
equal protection under the law.
The ability of the Equal Protection Clause to eliminate
sex discrimination is limited by the Court’s inconsistent
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard and its refusal
to subject claims of sex discrimination to the strict scrutiny
standard, the Court’s formalistic requirement that men and
women be deemed “similarly situated” for heightened scrutiny
to apply, and the Court’s focus on disparate treatment in all
equal protection cases.
A.

Limitations of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard in
Eradicating Sex Discrimination

Under the existing strict scrutiny standard, where a law
distinguishes between individuals on the basis of a “suspect
classification,” the government actor bears the burden of
demonstrating that the classification serves a compelling
government interest and is narrowly tailored to accomplish that
government interest.64 Currently, only classifications based on
race and national origin are considered “suspect” and therefore
warrant strict scrutiny review.65 Classifications based on sex are
subject to the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny.66 This is
because current equal protection jurisprudence reflects the idea
that:
[I]t is appropriate for courts to apply a less rigorous standard of
review
to
questions
concerning
equal
citizenship
for
women . . . [because] the nation never made a collective
64 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982).
65 Ryan Lozar & Tahmineh Maloney, Equal Protection, 3 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 141, 144 (2002).
66 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Laws not subject to strict or intermediate
scrutiny are subject to rational basis review. Rational basis review is the most deferential of
the three standards and applies to all classifications not affecting either a suspect or quasisuspect class or a fundamental right. To pass rational basis review, a law must have a
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Under rational basis review, when
a legitimate governmental interest is not readily apparent, courts may speculate as to what
legitimate governmental interest could conceivably motivate the state action. However, an
unclear connection between a classification and proffered governmental objective may
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. At a minimum, a governmental objective
cannot be steeped in class-based animus. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 135, 136 n.7-8 (2011).
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constitutional commitment to respect women as equal of
men . . . [and because of] a pervasive intuition that the problem of
sex discrimination is not as grave, harmful, or significant in
American history as the problem of race discrimination.67

To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a quasi-suspect
classification, such as sex, must serve government interests and
must be substantially related to those objectives.68 The Court
has demonstrated inconsistency in its interpretation of the
intermediate scrutiny standard. In the Court’s early sex
discrimination jurisprudence, it sometimes “required a lessthan-perfect fit between governmental ends and means, at times
sustaining classifications based on broad sex-based
generalizations.”69 In later cases, the Court usually applied a
more stringent test.70 Intermediate scrutiny reached a high
water mark in 1996 in United States v. Virginia,71 a case from
which the Court has since retreated.
In Virginia, the Court found that Virginia Military
Institute’s (VMI) male-only admission policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause.72 In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg,
the Court held that the defender of a law that creates a sexbased classification must produce an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for upholding the law.73 Such justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented for purposes of
litigation.74 Virginia argued that single sex education yields
important educational benefits and fosters diversity in
educational approaches.75 The Court determined, however, that
Virginia failed to show that VMI created or maintained its
male-only admissions policy in order to further the state’s
proffered justification.76 Moreover, the Court held that a
purpose to advance an array of education options was not
Siegel, supra note 36, at 1013-14.
Lozar & Maloney, supra note 65, at 147-48. However, the Court has upheld
sex based classifications without explicitly analyzing whether the relationship between
the objective and the classification qualified as substantial. In such instances, the
Court has relied at least in part on legislative judgment to find that a sufficient nexus
existed between the objective and the sex based classification. Id.
69 Davis, supra note 40, at 430-31 (upholding a Florida statute providing a
property tax exemption for widows, but not widowers, reasoning that widows generally
face greater financial difficulties than widowers (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
353-56 (1974))).
70 See supra note 6.
71 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
72 Id. at 534.
73 Id. at 531.
74 Id. at 535-36 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 648 (1975)).
75 Id. at 535.
76 Id. at 535-37.
67

68
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served by VMI’s male-only admissions policy and, therefore,
VMI’s justification was not “exceedingly persuasive.” 77
Virginia represented the pinnacle of intermediate
scrutiny as applied to sex discrimination cases. The inclusion of
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language and the
extent to which the Court’s opinion repeated the phrase seemed
to heighten the state’s burden when defending a law
discriminating on the basis of sex.78 Even though the stronger
version of intermediate scrutiny expressed in Virginia did not
go as far as the strict scrutiny standard, many scholars felt
there was no practical difference.79
Following Virginia, though, the Court almost
immediately backed away from the heightened intermediate
scrutiny standard, demonstrating its unwillingness to apply a
robust standard to sex discrimination cases. For example, in
Nguyen v. INS,80 the majority opinion did not use the
exceedingly persuasive justification language when it set out
the definition of intermediate scrutiny. In fact, while the Court
claimed to apply the intermediate scrutiny standard, the
standard it actually applied was considerably more lenient and
seemed more like rational basis than intermediate scrutiny.
In Nguyen, the Court considered a challenge to an
immigration law which imposed different requirements for
unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers to transmit United
States citizenship to children born abroad.81 An unmarried
father could transmit citizenship only if he performed specific
steps to establish paternity before the child turned 18, while a
child born to an unmarried woman abroad automatically
received the mother’s United States citizenship.82 The majority
opinion purported to apply heightened scrutiny in upholding
the statute and reasoned that the law did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because it was based on biological differences
between men and women.83
As Justice O’Connor’s dissent explained, the majority
ignored several aspects of the intermediate scrutiny test laid

Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79 See Sabrina Ariel Miesowitz, ERA is Still the Way, 3 N.Y.U. J.L & LIBERTY
124, 135 (2008) (citing Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Oct. 5, 1997, at 65).
80 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
81 Id. at 56-57.
82 Id. at 59.
83 Id. at 68.
77
78
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out in Virginia.84 The majority in Nguyen failed to consider the
historical background of the statute.85 Historical sex
discrimination was described in Virginia as the main impetus
for using a higher level of scrutiny to review sex-based
classifications.86 Justice O’Connor’s dissent showed that the
immigration law at issue reflected a stereotypical assumption
that children born out of wedlock were the sole responsibility of
the mother, the exact type of historical bias that intermediate
scrutiny was developed to combat.87 Unfortunately, the
majority opinion actually propagated this sexist assumption in
its opinion, despite the facts before the Court which directly
contradicted the majority’s biased view that mothers are more
likely to develop meaningful relationships with their children.88
Further, the Court relied on arguments that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) had not made to reach its
decision, ignoring Virginia’s holdings that the burden of
justification lies with the defender of the statute and that the
Court would only consider genuine arguments, as opposed to
those driven by litigation that the defender put forward.89
The Court has continued the trend of inconsistent
protection against sex discrimination seen in Virginia and
Nguyen. For example, it struck down the Violence Against
Women Act’s civil rights remedy in 2000 as an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power.90 Then, three years later, the
Court found the Family and Medical Leave Act was “a valid
legislative attempt to combat sex discrimination under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.”91
These apparent contradictions are not unexpected when
one considers the difficulty in applying the vague intermediate
scrutiny standard. The intermediate scrutiny standard
occupies the middle ground somewhere between rational basis
and strict scrutiny, and therefore its application by the
Supreme Court and the lower courts has proven to be

Id. at 78-79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 91.
86 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534, 538 (1996).
87 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 91.
88 Id. In actuality, Nguyen had been abandoned by his mother and raised by
his father. Id. at 89.
89 See Miesowitz, supra note 79, at 140.
90 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619, 627 (2000) (holding the civil
rights remedy exceeded congressional power under both Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the Commerce Clause).
91 Mayeri, supra note 2, at 757-58 (footnote omitted).
84
85
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unpredictable. Intermediate scrutiny is not functional because
it does not provide a clear and consistent rule.
One important goal of the ERA was to “provide an
immediate mandate, a nationally uniform theory of sex equality,
and the prospect of permanence to buttress individual and
political efforts to end discrimination.”92 This goal has not and
cannot be achieved using the intermediate scrutiny standard.
In contrast to [the] unpredictability [of the intermediate scrutiny
standard,] subjecting sex discrimination to strict scrutiny would
provide consistency across identity-based classifications such as race
and sex, providing more guidance for both lower courts and policy
makers. Further, strict scrutiny provides for less judicial discretion
because there are fewer circumstances where discrimination can be
justified in the face of such scrutiny . . . . According to one study,
under strict scrutiny, a claimant alleging discrimination has a [73%]
probability of success, while under intermediate scrutiny, a litigant
will prevail only [47%] of the time.93

Passage of the ERA would require that courts use a strict or
absolute scrutiny standard,94 thereby providing consistency in
the area of sex discrimination law, ensuring that the vast
majority of discriminatory laws would be struck down, and
discouraging the passage or enforcement of sex-biased laws.
B.

Formal Equality and the Fallacy of “Real” Differences

Under current equal protection jurisprudence, most sex
discrimination cases do not receive even the lesser
intermediate scrutiny standard of review. The Court will only
apply heightened scrutiny to cases where classes of people are
alike in all relevant ways except for a protected basis, such as
race or national origin (for the purposes of strict scrutiny), or

Miesowitz, supra note 79, at 129 (footnotes omitted).
Davis, supra note 40, at 437 (footnotes omitted); see also Lee Epstein et al.,
Constitutional Sex Discrimination, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 67 (2004). In contrast to
the relatively predictable outcomes under strict scrutiny and rational basis standards,
“when courts apply the intermediate standard, litigants alleging sex discrimination are
nearly as likely to win as they are to lose.” Epstein et al., supra note 93, at 67.
94 The absolute scrutiny standard would prohibit laws that distinguish between
individuals on the basis of sex except where: (1) they involve a physical characteristic
unique to one sex; (2) they are necessary to preserve other constitutional rights, such as
the right to personal privacy; or (3) they are part of a genuine affirmative action policy.
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). In each of these three exceptional
circumstances, the suspect law would be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. Thus, laws which
restrict reproductive autonomy would be subject to the strict scrutiny standard regardless
of whether absolute scrutiny could apply under the ERA.
92

93
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gender (for purposes of intermediate scrutiny).95 Otherwise, the
Court will merely look at whether there is any rational basis for
the classification and the state’s asserted objective in order to
uphold the discriminatory law.96 The Supreme Court has held
that physical or “real” differences between men and women may
constitute important reasons for gender classifications and
therefore justify discrimination.97
The real differences theory arises from the Court’s
formalistic interpretation that the Equal Protection Clause “is
essentially a direction that all persons ‘similarly situated’ should
be treated alike.”98 Such an analysis severely narrows the
definition of what can be considered unconstitutional sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. This is because
the Court has held, again and again, that differences in
treatment, where they correspond to differences between men and
women relating to biology, are not subject to the intermediate
scrutiny standard, much less the strict scrutiny standard, because
men and women are not “similarly situated” in those
circumstances.99 In so doing, the real differences theory justifies
depriving women of the rights and obligations of citizenship.
For example, in Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior
Court, the Court used the real differences theory to justify a
criminal statute which provides that only men can be charged
with statutory rape.100 There, the Court stated:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not “demand that a statute
necessarily apply equally to all persons” or require “things which are
different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the
same.” . . . [T]his Court has consistently upheld statutes where the
gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the
fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.101

The Court found that men and women are not “similarly situated”
for purposes of the statutory rape law because only women can
become pregnant and as a result women “suffer disproportionately
the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences
of sexual activity.”102

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

See Wharton, supra note 18, at 1216.
Id.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 469 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 471.
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The statute at issue in Michael M. may seem to benefit
women by protecting them from criminal prosecution; however,
in reality, it exposes children to sexual misconduct and
perpetuates stereotypes that portray men as predators and
women as docile victims. Like so many other cases, the Court
grounds its ruling in gender stereotypes and the idea that it is
permissible to treat women differently than men on the basis of
women’s reproductive capacity.103
In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court held that a state
disability insurance program which excluded pregnancy from
coverage did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because,
“[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women
are not.”104 The Court reached such a conclusion by hiding
behind the fallacy that the program differentiated between
pregnant and non-pregnant women, rather than recognizing
that because pregnancy is a physical condition which only
appears in women, the program discriminated on the basis of
sex.105 In its insistence on formal equality, the Court ignored
103 See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Before the Court’s
application of intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination cases in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), it upheld numerous gender classifications on the basis that women
require special protections because of their weaker physical and mental nature and
childbearer-rearer responsibilities. In fact, before the Court’s decision in Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court upheld every gender classification challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961), abrogated by
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (upholding a law which mandated jury service
for men, but permitted service by women because of a woman’s need to be in the home,
rather than engaged in “community life”); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948)
(upholding a law prohibiting women from employment as bartenders except where tavern
was owned by the woman’s father or husband in order to protect women’s moral and
physical well-being); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (allowing prohibition on
women working more than ten hours per day despite the recent Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) decision striking down a ten hour per day limitation applicable
to male bakery employees on the basis that it interfered with the constitutional right to
contract); Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(upholding ban on women practicing law because their “paramount destiny and
mission . . . are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother”).
104 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
105 Id. Geduldig was extended to cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000), under Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46
(1976) (holding that the failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities under a disability
benefit plan does not violate Title VII). Congress rejected this analysis for purposes of sex
discrimination in employment by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978,
which expanded the definition of “because of sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to include pregnancy, childbirth, and other related conditions. Nevertheless,
Geduldig continues to be good law. For example, in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, the Court explicitly relied on Geduldig’s holding that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex in holding that the practice of
denying women access to medical services by blockading abortion facilities did not
constitute the “class-based invidiously discriminatory animus” necessary to prove a

2015]

AT THE END OF OUR ARTICLE III ROPE

415

the long history of discrimination against, and subordination
of, women based on their reproductive capacity.
Carrying this logic forward, in 1980, the Court upheld
the Hyde Amendment which limited Medicaid abortion
funding.106 In Harris v. McRae, the plaintiffs argued that the
law violated the Equal Protection Clause because Medicaid
generally funds all medically necessary procedures and the
Hyde Amendment prohibited the funding of medically
necessary abortions.107 The Court found that the class of people
affected by the law was poor women.108 Because poverty is not a
suspect class, the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny and
upheld the law under the rational basis standard by finding
that the government’s “legitimate interest in protecting the
potential life” supported the law.109 The Court failed to
acknowledge that the Hyde Amendment denied medically
necessary procedures only to women and the government had no
rational basis for this sex-based disparate treatment.110 In
Geduldig and Harris, one can readily identify the Court’s
blatant refusal to admit that discrimination based on
reproductive capacity, choice, or autonomy is sex discrimination
and that laws which impact some, but not all, women on that
basis are discriminatory.
By relying on the real differences theory, the Court denies
the reality of discrimination against women on the basis of biology
and, particularly, their reproductive abilities and choices. The
real differences theory “strip[s] the ability to become pregnant of
any social meaning, ignoring the ways in which the legal
treatment of pregnancy defines the appropriate roles of women

violation of the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Bray, 506 U.S. at 271 (citations
omitted) (noting the continued vitality of Geduldig).
106 Harris, 448 U.S. 297.
107 Id. at 300-01.
108 Id. at 323.
109 Id. at 324.
110 Id. In fact, the Court did not analyze Harris v. McRae as a sex discrimination
case because it limited the “class” to poor women, as it had previously done in Geduldig
by limiting that class to pregnant women. In Harris, the Court further held that the
privacy right to an abortion did not come with a right to have the government fund an
abortion. It concluded that there is no right to abortion funding under the Equal
Protection Clause because it is a procedural guarantee and not a substantive one. This is
a very different conclusion than various state courts had reached, some of which did find
that funding all “medically necessary” procedures for men and not all “medically
necessary” procedures for women was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See
infra Part III.
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and, consequently, dictates women’s place in society.”111 Until
discrimination analysis acknowledges that the “real” biological
difference distinction is used to the disadvantage of women,
women will never be equal under the law.
The ERA would end the real differences approach. As
further explored in Part III, state courts construing their own
ERAs have generally recognized that when unique physical
characteristics are used to prejudice women, the purpose of
their respective ERAs is compromised, thus rejecting the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Geduldig112 and Harris.113 Under
the ERA, the Supreme Court could no longer ignore the fact
that women are discriminated on the basis of their
reproductive capacity, and the Court would be prevented from
upholding blatantly discriminatory laws on any rational basis.
C.

Covert Discrimination and the Need for Disparate
Impact Analysis

Another difficulty with current equal protection
jurisprudence is its inability to address the ubiquity of sex
discrimination.114 Most laws that have a disparate impact on
women are the product of subtle attitudes and entrenched
stereotypes about gender roles that exhibit the same
constitutional infirmities as laws that overtly classify men and
women, but are not redressed in the same way.115 Many rules
that appear neutral are premised on stereotypes of male-female
roles, such as the idea that men should and do provide for the
family by earning wages, while women are responsible for
childbearing and childrearing.116 “Legal rules, moreover, often
were built on male norms, but the process of designing such
‘male-centered’ rules rarely includes—and more rarely provides
evidence of—overt discriminatory intent.”117
Current equal protection jurisprudence offers no remedy
for these more insidious forms of discrimination because it
rejects disparate impact analysis. In Washington v. Davis, the
111 David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey
and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1883 (1995).
112 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
113 Harris, 448 U.S. at 297; see also Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Clinic, 506
U.S. 263 (1993).
114 Mayeri, supra note 57, at 1252.
115 Id.
116 Id. (footnotes omitted).
117 Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA
Legislative History Project (Mar. 21, 1983) (on file with Schlesigner Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 29)).
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Court held that race discrimination challenges to facially
neutral governmental action require proof of discriminatory
purpose to trigger strict scrutiny review under the Equal
Protection Clause.118 The Court applied this analysis to sex
discrimination in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney.119 In that case, the Court rejected a challenge to
Massachusetts’ policy of granting a lifetime preference to
veterans for state civil service positions.120 Like the law at issue
in Washington, this one was neutral on its face.121 However,
because over ninety-eight percent of veterans in Massachusetts
were male at that time, the preference overwhelmingly favored
male applicants.122
In ruling against the challenge, the Court held that
“purposeful discrimination is the condition that offends the
Constitution.”123 Since the plaintiffs could not show that the
law was enacted because of, not just in spite of, its adverse
impact on women, the Court found that the Massachusetts
veterans’ preference did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.124 Even the dissenters in Feeney did not move far from
an intent-based inquiry.125 In his dissent, Justice Marshall wrote
that Massachusetts absolute veterans’ preference “evinces
purposeful
gender-based
discrimination,”
and
applied
heightened scrutiny to the policy on that basis.126
The impact of Washington, Feeney, and their progeny is
that as discrimination becomes more subtle, those who are
discriminated against find less and less protection under the
Constitution.127 This is particularly detrimental for women
because many “laws and policies [ ] are embedded in sexist
stereotypes but expressed in gender neutral language.”128
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 274.
122 Id. at 270.
123 Id. at 274 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 Id. at 280.
125 Id. at 281-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id.
127 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (“[R]equiring proof
of conscious or intentional motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that
a decision is race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how the human
mind works.” (footnote omitted)); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1145 (1997).
128 Ann E. Freedman & Sylvia A. Law, Thomas I. Emerson: A Pioneer for
Women’s Equality, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 539, 551 (1988).
118

119
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Further, “courts fail to question the assumptions that social
institutions are gender-neutral, and that women and men are
therefore similarly related to those institutions.”129 In order to
address latent gender discrimination in employment, courts
have interpreted Title VII to prohibit policies and practices
which have a disparate impact on women, even where there is
no discriminatory intent.130 However, discriminatory impact
claims have been severely limited since their initial creation.
Claims which do not involve objective measures, such as
employment testing, are rarely successful.131
Under the ERA, evidence of a purpose or intent to
discriminate would not be required to invalidate governmental
action that has a disparate impact on gender.132 Rather,
heightened scrutiny would apply to those laws which reinforce
or perpetuate patterns similar to those associated with facial
or intentional discrimination.133 Strict review of indirect,
covert, or unconscious sex discrimination is essential to effect
an absolute ban on gender discrimination and only the ERA
can accomplish that goal.
III.

PASSING THE ERA TO CURE THE LIMITATIONS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE IN ACHIEVING
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE

Without significant reimagining of the Supreme Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence, it appears that women’s rights
advocates have achieved as much as can be achieved under
129 Edieth Y. Wu, Short Essay, American Women—The Struggle Continues, 12
J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 13, 22 (2010).
130 See Siegel, supra note 127, at 1144-45; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1226-30 (1989); Wharton, supra note 18, at 1226. Under Title VII, employment practices
which have the effect of discriminating on some prohibited basis are illegal. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (1991); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). To state a
prima facie case under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must show that a facially
neutral employment practice causes women to experience substantially different
opportunities or employment status than men. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1991); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Once the plaintiff meets her burden, the
defendant will have to show that the practice is “job related” and “consistent with
business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1991). If the employer meets this
burden, then the plaintiff can still succeed if she shows that a less discriminatory
alternative employment practice would serve the same purpose. Id. § 2000e-2(k).
131 See generally Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?,
53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006) (concluding that disparate impact theory has had a limited
impact outside of cases involving written employment tests and suggesting that the
theory has had the inadvertent impact of limiting intentional discrimination theory).
132 See Wharton, supra note 18.
133 Id.
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existing law. In fact, rights that women do have continue to be
constrained. The new laws proposed or passed in recent memory
which impact women all seem to restrict their rights,
particularly with regard to their rights to bodily integrity and
reproductive freedom.134 Even more troubling, laws of equal
application, like the Affordable Care Act, have been struck down
in whole or in part where they would act to protect the rights of
women—because women do not have the constitutional
protection necessary to defend their right to bodily integrity in
the face of the purported religious beliefs of others.135
The ERA would extend the scope of protection against sex
inequality well beyond that which is currently provided for by the
Equal Protection Clause. State high courts’ interpretations of
their respective state constitution ERAs136 illustrate that the ERA
is better situated to achieve comprehensive gender equality
under the law, particularly with regard to discrimination based
on women’s reproductive capabilities.137
A.

More Favorable Outcomes under the ERA, as Seen in
State Courts

In direct contradiction to the Supreme Court’s holding
in Harris v. McRae,138 state courts successfully have invoked
ERAs to support government funding of abortions for low
income women. “Some states[,] . . . notably Connecticut and
New Mexico, have applied a strict equality analysis to hold that
their constitutions require state funding of medically necessary
abortions for low income women.”139 In New Mexico Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reviewed N.M. Rule 766, which restricted state funding of
134 See Sarah M. Stephens, The Search for Authenticity and the Manipulation
of Tradition: Restrictions on Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United States and
Egypt, 19 CARDOZO J. OF LAW & GENDER 325, 326-27 (2013).
135 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30,
2014) (finding the contraceptive mandate violative of RFRA).
136 The following states have ERAs in their Constitutions: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. LESLIE W. GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS: STATE PROVISIONS 3-6 (2004), available at
https://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/documents/olddocs/era/082304c
rsStateERAs.pdf.
137 “However . . . not every state with an ERA has adopted strict scrutiny or
absolute scrutiny. A few follow federal equal protection law in construing their ERAs and
apply intermediate scrutiny.” Davis, supra note 40, at 434 (footnotes omitted). A federal
constitutional amendment would remedy the lack of uniformity across jurisdictions.
138 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
139 Davis, supra note 40, at 442.
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abortion “to those certified by a physician as necessary to save
the life of the mother or to end an ectopic pregnancy, or when
the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.”140
The court first held that strict scrutiny was appropriate
even though Rule 766 addressed a physical characteristic
unique to women, plainly abrogating the real differences
approach.141 In making this determination, the court
specifically noted “the fact that [s]ince time immemorial,
women’s biology and ability to bear children have been used as
a basis for discrimination against them.”142 The court found
that New Mexico’s ERA demanded it look “beyond the
classification to the purpose of the law” to decide whether the
law under scrutiny operated to the disadvantage of women.143
“The question at hand is whether the government had the power
to turn th[e] capacity [to bear children] limited as it is to one
gender, into a source of social disadvantage.”144 The court found
that both sexes were “similarly situated” in relation to Medicaid
coverage because the criteria for Medicaid eligibility was the
same for each sex and the state was required to fund all
medically necessary services.145 The court also determined that
there was “no comparable restriction” on coverage for any
condition that was “unique to men.”146 Drawing on these facts,
the court struck down N.M. Rule 766, holding that the rule
unconstitutionally “single[d] out for less favorable treatment a
gender-linked condition that is unique to women”147 and that
the interests “put forward by the state [in] costs savings and
interest in potential life of the unborn[ ] were insufficient to
justify the measure.”148
Likewise, in Doe v. Maher,149 the Connecticut Superior
Court found unconstitutional a regulation restricting Medicaid
payment for therapeutic abortions150 to those necessary to save
the life of the mother.151 The court criticized the five member
majority in Harris v. McRae who held that similar restrictions
New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 846 (N.M. 1998).
Id. at 854.
142 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143 Id.
144 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Id. at 855.
146 Id. at 856.
147 Id. at 856-57.
148 Davis, supra note 40, at 443.
149 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
150 A “therapeutic abortion” is an “abortion[ ]
necessary to ameliorate a
condition that is deleterious to a woman’s physical or psychological heath.” Id. at 135 n.4.
151 Id. at 135.
140

141
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under the Hyde Amendment did not violate the federal Equal
Protection Clause.152 The court found “it difficult to accept the
rationale of the majority of the United States Supreme Court”
that held “the restriction on Medicaid [funded] abortions [does]
not impinge on the constitutional right of liberty and the
classification is not predicated on ‘criteria that are, in a
constitutional sense, suspect.’”153 The court also disagreed that
the discriminatory restrictions on Medicaid funding “were
rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
‘protecting the potential life of the fetus.’”154
The Connecticut court rejected the formal equality
framework used by the Court in Harris v. McRae. The court
found that the Connecticut regulation violated the privacy
rights of “the plaintiff poor woman class and the physician
class under the state’s due process clause.”155 The court went on
to find that the regulation discriminated on the basis of sex in
violation of the state’s ERA.156 The court pointed out that under
the Medicaid program, all medically necessary expenses for men
and women are covered, except for therapeutic abortions that
are not life-threatening.157 The court also specifically pointed out
that all medical expenses associated with male reproductive
health, family planning, and medical conditions unique to men
were covered.158 Most importantly, the court found that:
[B]y adopting the ERA, Connecticut determined that the state
should no longer be permitted to disadvantage women because of
their sex including their reproductive capabilities. It is therefore
clear, under the Connecticut ERA, that the regulation excepting
medically necessary abortions from the Medicaid program
discriminates against women, and, indeed, poor women.159

Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the court went on to find
the regulation violated Connecticut’s ERA.160

Id. at 158.
Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 324 (1980)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 157.
156 Id. at 160.
157 Id. at 159.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 160.
160 Id. at 162; see also Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397
(Mass. 1981) (holding that the failure to pay for medically necessary abortions violated
the due process clause of the Massachusetts constitution).
152
153
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B. Applying an ERA Analysis to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.
In contrast to the rulings of these and other state
supreme courts,161 the United States Supreme Court consistently
refuses to recognize discrimination based on women’s
reproductive capabilities as sex discrimination. If the ERA were
enacted, it would force the Court to re-evaluate its position on
the treatment of pregnancy and the related issue of abortion
funding.162 It would also prohibit the Court from relying on sex
161 “The majority of state courts, however, have found that a central reason
that their ERA was enacted was to treat sex discrimination with at least the same
degree of skepticism as racial discrimination, requiring a higher level of review than
intermediate scrutiny.” Davis, supra note 40, at 434.
162 It is likely that the innumerable restrictions on abortion funding would be
struck down following the passage of the ERA. For an explanation of these restrictions,
see JON SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33467, ABORTION: JUDICIAL
HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 12-13 (2014). For example,

The Hyde Amendment process has not been limited to appropriations for
[Health and Human Services (HHS)]. Beginning with P.L. 95-457, the [DOD]
appropriations measures have contained Hyde-type abortion limitations. This
recurring prohibition was eventually codified and made permanent by P.L.
98-525, the [DOD] Authorization Act of 1984. In 1983, the Hyde Amendment
process was extended to the Department of the Treasury and Postal Service
Appropriations Act, prohibiting the use of funds for the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) to pay for abortions, except when the life
of the woman was in danger. Prior to this restriction, federal government
health insurance plans reportedly paid an estimated $9 million for both
therapeutic and non-therapeutic abortions . . . . Under [DOJ] appropriations,
funding of abortions in prisons is prohibited, except where the life of the
mother is endangered, or in cases of rape. First enacted as part of the FY1987
Continuing Resolution, P.L. 99-591, this provision [was] reenacted as part of
the annual spending bill in each subsequent fiscal year . . . . [S]ince 1979,
restrictive abortion provisions have been included in appropriations
measures for the District of Columbia . . . . Under the so-called Dornan
Amendment [P.L. 100-462] D.C. was prohibited from using both appropriated
funds and local funds to pay for abortions . . . . [T]he Family Planning
Services and Population Research Act of 1970, P.L. 91-572 (42 U.S.C. 300a-6),
bars the use of funds for programs in which abortion is a method of family
planning. The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, P.L. 93-355 (42 U.S.C.
2996f(b)(8)), prohibits lawyers in federally funded legal aid programs from
providing legal assistance for procuring non-therapeutic abortions and
prohibits legal aid in proceedings to compel an individual or an institution to
perform an abortion, assist in an abortion, or provide facilities for an
abortion . . . . [Additionally,] the Civil Rights Commission Amendments Act of
1994, P.L. 103-419 (42 U.S.C. sec. 1975a(f)), prohibits the commission from
studying or collecting information about U.S. laws and policies concerning
abortion. [Finally, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA,
P.L. 111-148),] individuals who receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing
subsidy will be permitted to select a qualified health plan that includes coverage
or elective abortions. However, to ensure that funds attributable to such a credit
or subsidy are not used to pay for elective abortion services, ACA prescribes
payment and accounting requirements for plan issuers and enrollees . . . . [The
plan issuer is] required to collect two separate payments from each enrollee in the
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stereotyping or formalistic and superficial analyses when
deciding sex-related cases. As illustrated by New Mexico Right
to Choose and Doe v. Maher, a rehearing of cases such as
Harris v. McRae,163 Maher v. Roe,164 or Rust v. Sullivan165
within the ERA framework would produce a different outcome.
Under the ERA, the Supreme Court also would have likely
reached a different decision in its most recent opinion to impact
women’s reproductive choices: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.166 In Hobby Lobby, the Court ruled that Hobby Lobby, as a
privately owned corporation,167 has the right to refuse to comply

plan”[—a separate payment for coverage of elective abortions—and] deposit the
separate payments into separate allocation accounts that consist solely of each
type of payment and that are used exclusively to pay for the specified
services . . . . The ACA also permits a state to prohibit abortion coverage in
exchange plans by enacting with such a prohibition.
Id. at 12-14. In obvious discrimination, “the ACA requires that there be at least one multistate plan in each exchange in each state that does not cover abortion services beyond
those permitted by the Hyde Amendment.” What Women Need to Know About Healthcare
Reform, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR (2010), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/hcr__abortion_updated_11-10.pdf (emphasis added). Meanwhile, states
are allowed to pass laws to prohibit all private insurance coverage of abortion within the
state, banning coverage in plans both inside and outside an exchange. SHIMABUKURO,
supra, at 14 (referring to Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148
sec. 1303(a)(1) (2010).
163 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S.
358, 369 (1980) (finding that an Illinois statutory funding restriction that was
comparable to the Hyde Amendment also did not contravene the constitutional
restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).
164 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program to pay expenses
incident to nontherapeutic abortions simply because the state has made a policy choice to
pay expenses incident to childbirth and holding that Connecticut’s policy of favoring
childbirth over abortion did not impinge upon the fundamental right to privacy
recognized in Roe v. Wade).
165 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (upholding on both statutory and
constitutional grounds the Department of Health and Human Service’s Title X
regulations restricting recipients of federal family planning funding from using federal
funds to counsel women about the option of abortion). The Court reasoned that there
was no constitutional violation because the government has no duty to subsidize an
activity simply because it is constitutionally protected and because a woman is “in no
worse position than if Congress had never enacted Title X.” Id.; see also Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1977) (holding that “nothing in either the language or the
legislative history of Title XIX” of the Social Security Act (Medicaid) requires a
participating state to fund every medical procedure falling within the delineated
categories of medical care). The Court ruled that it was not inconsistent with the act’s
goals to refuse to fund unnecessary medical services. However, the Court indicated that
Title XIX left a state free to include coverage for non-therapeutic abortions should it
choose to do so. Beal, 432 U.S. at 446-47; see also Poelkher v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521
(1977) (upholding a municipal regulation that denied indigent pregnant women nontherapeutic abortions at public hospitals).
166 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014).
167 The majority opinion attempted to cast this decision as narrow because it
applies to a “for-profit closely held corporation[ ] .” Id. slip op. at 31. Hobby Lobby
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with the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that health insurance
plans offered to employees make certain contraceptives
available.168 Hobby Lobby objected to the provision of four
particular contraceptives, which it denoted as “abortifacients”169
and argued that offering an insurance policy which covered those
particular contraceptives violated its rights under the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).170
The RFRA prohibits the “Government [from]
substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion . . . ”
unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”171 The Court
determined that the RFRA applies to privately held corporations
and that the owners of Hobby Lobby hold sincere Christian
beliefs that life begins at conception and that offering a health
insurance policy which covers the four contraceptives would be

employs 13,000 employees in 600 locations through 39 states. Frederick Mark Gedicks
& Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would
Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 53 (2014). Forbes
Magazine estimates Hobby Lobby’s annual revenue exceeds $2 billion. Id. at 53 n.6. It
is estimated that as many as 90% of all businesses in the United States are closely held
and that closely held corporations employ more than half of the American workforce.
Aaron Blake, A LOT of People Could Be Affected by the Supreme Court’s Birth Control
Decision—Theoretically, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affected-by-the-supreme-courts-birthcontrol-decision/.
168 Hobby Lobby, slip op at 48. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) does not itself
require insurance plans to cover contraception. Rather, the ACA requires coverage of
preventative women’s healthcare without cost sharing by patients. The Institute of Medicine
used neutral scientific and medical criteria to determine that preventative care coverage
should include all FDA-approved contraceptive methods. George J. Annas et al., Money, Sex,
and Religion—The Supreme Court’s ACA Sequel, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED., 862, 862 (2014).
169 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 12. Both federal law and the American Medical
Association specifically negate this factual contention. While the Court referred to
these medications as “abortifacients” in its opinion, this is a misnomer. Id. The four
medications that Hobby Lobby objected to are two intrauterine devices (IUD) and two
emergency contraceptive pills. None of these medications will disrupt an established
pregnancy. While it is a common belief, even at the Supreme Court, that an IUD will
prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, current science indicates that IUDs prevent
fertilization. See Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Defendants-Appellees at 12-20, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3rd Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1144).
170 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4,
(1993), amended by Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42
U.S.C. § 21C (2000) (RFRA).
171 Id. (note this statute incorporates the strict scrutiny standard currently
denied to sex discrimination claims).
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contrary to that religious belief.172 The Court, ruling in favor of
Hobby Lobby, held that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive
mandate substantially burdens the exercise of religion provided
for in the RFRA; and the mandate is not the least restrictive
means of furthering the government’s interest.173 “For the first
time, the Supreme Court exempted for-profit businesses from
employee-protective law in the name of religion.”174 Not
surprisingly, the only other legislative exemptions for for-profit
corporations are statutes which allow hospitals to refuse to
provide critical reproductive healthcare: abortions.175
The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby is overtly
prejudicial against women. Singling out women’s reproductive
choices, the Court states “[t]his decision concerns only the
contraception mandate and should not be understood to hold
that all insurance coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or
blood transfusions, must necessarily fail if they conflict with an
employer’s religious beliefs.”176 Thus, employers and federal
healthcare programs may discriminate against women in their
medical care, but the Court’s opinion should not be read to
apply where it might impact men or non-reproductive related
issues.177 Under the Court’s prior decisions in Geduldig and its
progeny, this result is permissible.178
The Hobby Lobby decision demonstrates the need for a
constitutional guarantee of equality and provides a good
example of the ongoing tension between women’s rights and
other constitutionally or statutorily protected rights.179
Opponents of women’s rights have been using their right to
religious freedom as a sword in the so-called “War on
Women.”180 Without a constitutional shield, women’s rights,
Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 30.
Id. at 39. The Court did not reach Hobby Lobby’s First Amendment
argument. Id. at 48.
174 Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 28 (2014).
175 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)).
176 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 45. Although outside the scope of this article, the
Court’s opinion also appears to violate the Establishment Clause by favoring religion, as
opposed to the absence of belief, and specifically the Christian faith. Here, he specifically
points out that medical procedures objected to on religious grounds by Jehovah’s
witnesses would be covered despite their religious beliefs. See generally Gedicks &
Koppelman, supra note 167.
177 The Supreme Court arguably sidestepped this issue by suggesting that the
government could just cover the cost of the contraceptives, however this suggestion
would still place a significant and unnecessary burden on female employees and on the
government. Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 39.
178 See supra Part II.B.
179 See Stephens, supra note 134, at 326-27.
180 Id.
172
173
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even the constitutionally protected right to privacy guaranteed
by Griswold v. Connecticut,181 will be outweighed by the right to
freedom of expression, whether provided for by statute or the
First Amendment.
If analyzed under the ERA, Hobby Lobby’s challenge to
the contraceptive mandate would have failed. The Court still
may have concluded that the RFRA applies to private
corporations and that the contraception mandate interfered with
Hobby Lobby’s exercise of that right under the RFRA. However,
the Court would also have had to acknowledge that the RFRA is
federal government action and, as applied in Hobby Lobby,
violates women’s right to equal treatment under the law and
deprives them of a valuable legal entitlement by preventing
their equal access to a federally mandated insurance program.
Analyzing Hobby Lobby within the ERA framework shows that
the RFRA works to unconstitutionally disadvantage women
because of their sex, in the same way that restrictions on
Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions were found
unconstitutional under state ERAs in New Mexico Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Johnson and Doe v. Maher.
Under the ERA, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
that has negatively impacted women’s rights likely would have
been decided differently, and, indeed, the passage of the ERA
would act to revise the legal basis for some of these precedents.
Decisions such as Hobby Lobby, demonstrate both the
limitation of the litigation strategy pursued by women’s rights
advocates and the reinvigorated need to write the “principle of
equal rights . . . into the framework of our government.”182
CONCLUSION
The litigation strategy pursued by equal rights
advocates achieved many of the results hoped for by feminists
in the 1960s and 1970s. There has been arguably little progress
since then. Women continue to be treated unequally under the
law, in part because the intermediate scrutiny standard
permits gender discrimination in certain circumstances. This is
particularly true when analyzing laws that deal with women’s
181 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding the right of married
people to obtain and use contraception pursuant to a right of marital privacy); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right to privacy to protect a woman’s
right to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold
to unmarried persons on equal protection grounds).
182 Francis, supra note 29.
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biological differences from men and impact women’s
reproductive autonomy. Further, it appears that the Supreme
Court is unwilling to expand existing constitutional
jurisprudence to grant any greater protection against
discrimination than currently exists. Our best hope for equality
is an expansive constitutional amendment which purports to
outlaw overt and covert gender discrimination. “No ordinary
statute can provide the bedrock protection assured by a
Constitutional Amendment. No Court decision can provide that
protection, for the courts may interpret, but they may not
amend the Constitution.”183
In 1978, and again in 1981, the bipartisan United States
Commission on Civil Rights urged ratification of the ERA,
declaring:
attainment of full, equal rights for women and men requires
ratification of the proposed amendment. The need for the ERA is at
least as great today as it was when Congress proposed the
amendment to the States in 1972. Measured by any standard, gender
lines have not been erased, and the history of unequal treatment of
men and women has not been adequately redressed under existing
law. Moreover, as a result of experiences under State constitutional
amendments virtually identical to the proposed Federal amendment,
it is even clearer now than it was in 1972 that the ERA is the
appropriate remedial action to address this inequality and assure
women and men equal justice before the law.184

This statement is as true today as it was then. Equality
of rights for women and men remains as elusive now as it did
in 1981, but state ERAs have shown that greater equality can
be achieved through a constitutional amendment. The ERA
continues to be an active goal of women’s rights organizations
and remains viable before the United States Congress, as well
as legislatures around the country.185 It is time to re-focus on
the ERA as the avenue to create a new paradigm for analyzing
case law, to undo the negative jurisprudence which allows
discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes and women’s
biological ability to bear children, and to create new
momentum for true equality under the law.

183 UNITED
STATES COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 5
(1981),
available
at
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/
cr11068.pdf (citing American Bar Association, About the ERA 2 (Apr. 1980)).
184 Id. (quoting UNITED STATES, COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 4 (1978)).
185 See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.

